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Peacekeeping: Issues of U.S. Military Involvement
SUMMARY
For almost a decade, Congress has
expressed reservations about many complex
and intertwined peacekeeping issues. The
Bush Administration’s desire to reduce the
commitment of U.S. troops to international
peacekeeping stems largely from the major
concerns of recent Congresses: that peace-
keeping duties are detrimental to military
“readiness,” i.e., the ability of U.S. troops to
defend the nations.  Critics, however, are
concerned that withdrawals of U.S. troops
from peacekeeping commitments will under-
mine U.S. leadership. 
Thousands of U.S. military personnel
currently serve in or support peacekeeping
operations, performing tasks ranging from
providing humanitarian relief to monitoring
and enforcing cease-fires or other agreements
designed to separate parties in conflict. Of
these, 43 were serving  in seven operations
under U.N. control (as of October 31, 2001).
Others are serving full-time in operations run
unilaterally by the Department of Defense
(DOD) or together with U.S. allies in support
of these operations, particularly the NATO
Stabilization Force (SFOR) in  Bosnia and the
NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR).  About 37,000
more serve in or support peacekeeping opera-
tions in South Korea.  These “peacekeeping”
operations are undertaken to promote, main-
tain, enforce, or enhance the possibilities for
peace, and can sometimes be dangerous. 
For Congress, two initial  issues were (1)
whether U.S. troops should be placed under
U.N. control and (2) when the President shou-
ld consult with and seek congressional ap-
proval to deploy U.S. troops on peacekeeping
missions.  As the number of troops under U.N.
control declined steeply, the first concern
became less pressing. Regarding the second,
Congress is currently informed through
regular monthly consultation between the
armed services and foreign affairs committees
(usually at the staff level) and executive
branch officers.  Other important concerns
have been the high cost of and the appropriate
method for funding DOD peacekeeping activi-
ties, and how much of U.S. contributions to
U.N. peacekeeping should be reimbursed. 
Currently, the most salient Congressional
peacekeeping concern is the military
“readiness” issue.  Policymakers worry that
peacekeeping costs drain funds that DOD uses
to prepare its forces to defend against a threat
to U.S. vital interests, that peacekeeping
deployments stress a force whose size is
inadequate to handle such operations, and that
deployed troops lose their facility for perform-
ing combat tasks. A related issue is the suit-
ability and desirability of U.S. military partici-
pation in peacekeeping operations.  
The Bush Administration has negotiated
with allies to reduce U.S. military troops in
Bosnia,  and has stated that it will not commit
U.S. troops to the peacekeeping operation in
Afghanistan. Still, with some policymakers
and analysts arguing that the uncertainties of
the post-September 11 world demand a greater
U.S. commitment to curbing ethnic instability,
one issue facing the 107th Congress is what, if
any, adjustments should be made in order to
perform peacekeeping missions – in Afghani-
stan or elsewhere – with less strain on the
force, or whether the United States should




As reported by the House Appropriations Committee on May 15, 2002, the FY2002
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations bill (H.R. 4775, H.Rept. 107-480), would restrict
U.S. troops from participating in U.N. peacekeeping operations unless assurances are
provided against any possible prosecution by the International Criminal Court.  (See Section
on Proposed  Legislative Restrictions on U.S. Military Participation in U.N. Peacekeeping
Operations.)  The Senate version of the bill (S. 2551, S.Rept. 107-156), as reported by the
Senate Appropriations Committee on May 22, contains no such language. 
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Many questions have been raised in debate over U.S. involvement in international
peacekeeping.  These have ranged from the basic question of definition — what is
peacekeeping? — to the broad strategic question — how and when does it serve U.S.
interests?  Some issues directly concern U.S. military involvement and are discussed here,
or in other CRS reports.  For several Congresses, two primary issues were (1) when should
the President consult Congress and seek its approval to send U.S. troops on peacekeeping
missions; and (2) whether Congress should restrict the placement of U.S. troops under U.N.
control.  The first issue is covered briefly below, and more completely in other CRS Reports.
The second is covered in CRS Report RL31120, Peacekeeping: Military Command and
Control Issues.  Currently, Congressional attention focuses on three issues: (1) the costs of
peacekeeping, (2) peacekeeping operations’ effects on the U.S. military’s warfighting
capacity (“readiness”), and (3) the suitability and desirability of deploying U.S. troops on
peacekeeping missions.  (See CRS Issue Brief IB90103, United Nations Peacekeeping:
Issues for Congress, for information on the costs of U.N. operations and its capability to
handle them.)
Debate over peacekeeping has been complicated by the difficult context in which the
demand for U.S. troops and funds for such operations takes place.  At home, this has
included the downsizing of U.S. forces, and the press of U.S. domestic programs for funds
spent on the military and on foreign aid.  Internationally, complicating factors have included
the sometimes fractious  relationship between the United States as a world leader and its
allies, and the nature of current ethnic and regional conflicts.
Context for the Debate
The Definitional Problem
“Peacekeeping” is a broad, generic, and often imprecise term to describe the many
activities that the United Nations and other international organizations undertake to promote,
maintain, enforce, or enhance the possibilities for peace.  These activities range from
providing observers to monitor elections, recreating police or civil defense forces for the new
governments of those countries, organizing humanitarian relief efforts, and monitoring and
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enforcing cease-fires and other arrangements designed to separate parties recently in conflict.
The use of the term “peacekeeping” gained currency in the late 1950s, when United Nations
peacekeeping efforts mostly fit a narrower definition:  providing an “interpositional” force
to separate parties that had been in conflict and to supervise the keeping of a peace accord
they had signed.  In 1992, the United Nations began to use a broader terminology to describe
the different types of peacekeeping activities.  In particular, it created the term “peace
enforcement” to describe operations where peacekeepers are allowed to use force because
of a greater possibility of conflict or a threat to their safety.  Subsequently, the
Administration and executive branch agencies replaced the term “peacekeeping” with “peace
operations.”  (DOD categorizes peace operations among its “operations other than war”
[OOTW].)  Congress has tended to use the term “peacekeeping,” as does this Issue Brief.
The definitional problem stems from a semantic dilemma:  no single term currently in use
can accurately capture the broad and ambiguous nature of all these types of operations.  Use
of any term with the word “peace” conveys the misleading impression that they are without
risk, when, in fact, “peace” operations can place soldiers in hostile situations resembling war.
Current U.S. Military Participation in Peacekeeping
Thousands of U.S. military personnel participate full-time in a variety of activities that
fall under the rubric of peacekeeping  operations, most sponsored or otherwise endorsed by
the United Nations. As of March 31, 2002, 35 U.S. troops were serving in seven U.N.
peacekeeping operations.  These are located in the Middle East (14 in two operations), the
Western Sahara (7), Georgia (2), Kosovo (2), East Timor (3), and Ethiopia/Eritrea (7). Other
U.S. forces are deployed in unilateral U.S. operations and coalition operations, most
undertaken with U.N. authority.  As of early April 2002, some 3,000 U.S. troops were
participating in the NATO Bosnia Stabilization Force (SFOR), and 5,300 in the NATO
Kosovo Force (KFOR).  Others in Macedonia provide support to KFOR.  (Numbers fluctuate
by the hundreds with troop rotations.)  Over 37,000 U.S. troops serve in South Korea under
bilateral U.S.-Republic of Korea agreements and U.N. authority.  Some 865 serve in the
Sinai-based coalition Multilateral Force (MFO), which has no U.N. affiliation.
Approximately 20,000 (the numbers have fluctuated somewhat) U.S. troops — mostly
sailors and marines — usually have been  involved in Southwest Asia around Iraq for the
past several years, enforcing maritime sanctions in the Arabian Sea and two no-fly zones
over northern and southern Iraq.  (The Bush Administration had budgeted for 18,000 during
FY2002.) These tasks are among those involved in “peace enforcement” efforts, i.e., the
upper end of the peacekeeping spectrum where unstable situations require the threat or
application of military force, although the Bush Administration is, as of FY2002, budgeting
them as ongoing peacetime U.S. activities. The air operations — Northern Watch and
Southern Watch — are performed in coalition with the United Kingdom.  (See CRS Report
98-120, Iraq Crisis: U.S. and Allied Forces, for  information on U.S. activities around Iraq.)
Several other nations contribute to operations in the Arabian Sea. 
PDD 25 and Clinton Administration Policy
On May 3, 1994, President Clinton signed a classified presidential decision directive
(PDD 25) that defined the scope and conditions of future U.S. participation in, and
contributions to, multilateral (mostly United Nations) peacekeeping efforts.   (References in
this Issue Brief are to a 15-page unclassified summary, “The Clinton Administration’s Policy
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on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations,” Department of State Publication 10161, May
1994.)  As the Clinton Administration’s statement of peacekeeping policy, which remains
in effect for the Bush Administration unless revoked or superseded by a subsequent directive,
it defined guidelines for U.S. support of and U.S. military participation in multilateral
peacekeeping operations that narrowed the broad, “assertive” multilateralist vision the
Administration expounded during its first year which had cast the United Nations, with U.S.
support, as a central player in ensuring world stability.  PDD 25 delineated the more
restrained role for peacekeeping that Administration officials articulated after the deaths of
U.S. special operations forces in Somalia in 1993 made peacekeeping operations highly
controversial.  (See CRS Report 94-260, Peacekeeping in Future U.S. Foreign Policy, for
a discussion of PDD 25 and a copy of the unclassified summary.)
Under PDD 25 guidelines, a primary consideration for U.S. support of multilateral
peacekeeping operations was to be whether “there is a threat to or breach of international
peace and security.” Basic considerations for political and financial support were whether
U.N. or other peacekeeping operations advanced U.S. interests and whether other countries
would commit adequate resources.  In deciding whether to send U.S. troops, other factors to
consider were:  whether the U.S. presence is essential to an operation’s success, the risks to
U.S. troops are acceptable, resources are available, and domestic and congressional support
“exists or can be marshaled.”  Where U.S. troops might encounter combat, other factors
included whether there are: “a determination to commit sufficient forces to achieve clearly
defined objectives;”  “a plan to achieve those objectives decisively;” and “a commitment to
reassess and adjust” as necessary the size, composition, and use of forces.  Despite PDD 25
and its guidelines, or perhaps because of it, the debate over peacekeeping intensified. 
The Bush Administration Policy 
During his presidential campaign, President Bush expressed a dislike for open-ended
“nation-building” missions involving U.S. ground forces, but did not promise any specific
actions regarding peacekeeping operations.   However, Condeleeza Rice, then his foreign
policy advisor and currently National Security Advisor, stated during the campaign that if
elected Bush would end U.S. participation in Balkans peacekeeping operations. Since the
election, Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld urged a withdrawal of U.S. troops from
peacekeeping duties, with specific references to the Balkans and the Sinai, and from the
training of African troops for peacekeeping, although in early June he acknowledged that
U.S. troops must be present in Kosovo. Secretary of State Colin Powell (who as an active-
duty army general was known for deep reservations regarding peacekeeping) has emphasized
that the United States must respect its commitments abroad.  Critics of reducing or
withdrawing U.S. commitments have argued, however, that relatively few U.S. troops are
involved in peacekeeping operations compared to the large forward presence of the U.S.
elsewhere, including some 37,000 troops (technically involved in peacekeeping) in Korea
and some 40,000 in Japan.
Administration Sought – and Apparently Gained – Reductions in Bosnia.
 Bush Administration actions are consistent with President-elect Bush’s remarks in early
2001 that he was “in consultation with our allies” concerning his desire to reduce the U.S.
peacekeeping presence in the Balkans.  Denying that he intended to precipitously withdraw
U.S. troops, the President-elect nonetheless stated that “we’d like for them [the allies] to be
the peacekeepers....And it’s going to take a while.” (New York Times, January 14, 2001)
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After that, the de facto Bush Administration policy, at least towards Bosnia, appeared to be
to quietly seek to minimize forces through negotiations with U.S. allies.  For Bosnia, the
Bush administration sought to reduce the U.S. presence through established NATO
procedures, bringing the U.S. presence down by about 500 from some 3,600 to 3,100; that
approach seems to have been quietly effective.  (For more on Bush Administration
statements and policy regarding U.S. troops in Bosnia, see CRS Report RL30906,
Bosnia-Hercegovina and U.S. Policy.  For U.S. military commitments abroad, see
[http://web1.whs.osd.mil/mmid/military/miltop.htm].) 
Administration Resists Using U.S. Peacekeepers in Afghanistan. T h e
Bush Administration has consistently maintained that no U.S. troops will participate in the
British-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) of 4,500-5,000 troops, contributed
by 18 countries.  ISAF patrols Kabul and its surrounding areas under a United Nations
Chapter VII authorization.  (It is not, however, a U.N.-commanded or -funded operation.)
The United States has some 7,000 soldiers deployed in Afghanistan in a combat role.  They
do provide some assistance to the ISAF, which consists of logistical, intelligence, and quick
reaction force support, according to Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld.  They also provide
training and assistance for the formation of an Afghani national military.  
The Bush Administration is facing increasing pressure to reconsider its position.  In
April 2002, statements by  several interested parties – the ranking Afghani diplomat to the
United States, the Pakistani Ambassador to the United States, and the head of an
international relief organization – were reported, all urging the Administration to reconsider
its position.  (See “U.S. Urged to Expand Presence in Afghanistan,” Washington Post, April
22, 2002; “Expanded Peacekeeper Role Sought,” Washington Times, April 25, 2002.)  Some
U.S. officials outside the Pentagon are also reported to favor at least a temporary U.S.
peacekeeping role, most prominent among them is, reportedly, Secretary of State Powell.
(See “U.S. Resists Putting GIs Among Warlords,” Washington Times, March 11, 2002.)
Proponents of U.S. military participation in Afghanistan peacekeeping argue that the United
States must commit its own forces to peacekeeping in order to provide the necessary
leadership to increase the size and expand the scope of the current peacekeeping force.  They
argue this is necessary in order to control a dangerous and deteriorating security situation in
the countryside as warlords compete for power, and to prevent that situation from impeding
the consolidation of a central government and the delivery of humanitarian aid.  Secretary
Rumsfeld counters that the long-term stability of Afghanistan depends on whether Afghanis
can themselves develop the mechanisms to govern peacefully.  This process, he argue, would
be impeded by an intrusive foreign peacekeeping presence.  (See “U.S.:  Afghan Security
Void Useful,” Washington Times, April 24, 2002.) 
QDR Promised to Address Issues Created by Peacekeeping.  The September
30, 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) suggested that the Bush Administration was
willing to maintain peacekeeping in its military tool kit to help deter aggression in selected
circumstances and areas.  The QDR stated that the United States must, together with its allies
and friends, “maintain and prepare” its forces for peacetime “smaller-scale contingency
operations;” smaller-scale contingency operations is a category which includes support for
humanitarian operations and disaster relief, peace accord implementation and other forms
of peacekeeping, maritime sanction and “no fly” zone enforcement, shows of force,
counterdrug operations, noncombatant evacuation operations, and strikes and other limited
intervention.  The document (available through the Department of Defense website) also
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stated that “DoD will explicitly plan to provide a rotational base – a larger base of forces
from which to provide forward deployed forces – to support long-standing contingency
commitments in the critical areas of interest....Moreover, DoD will ensure that it has
sufficient numbers of specialized forces and capabilities to ensure that it does not overstress
elements of the force when it is involved in smaller-scale contingency operations.”
In short, the document promises that DOD will address the stresses created by current
policies for deploying forces to contingency operations such as peacekeeping (see sections
on the readiness controversy, below) and by the current mix of U.S. forces that many view
as inappropriate to handle the current range of operations.  The document also states that the
new planning construct to be employed by DOD “explicitly calls for the force to be sized for
defending the homeland, forward deterrence, warfighting missions, and the conduct of
smaller-scale contingency operations.”  It does not address an increase in force size.
Issues of U.S. Military Involvement
Executive Consultation and Congressional Approval
A primary concern of Congress is that it be consulted about the commitment of U.S.
forces in peacekeeping operations; many Members also want Congress’ approval sought if
and when U.S. forces are to be placed at risk.  Debate over the type of consultation and
approval that the executive branch must seek is a continuation of the ongoing dispute
regarding powers under the Constitution to deploy U.S. troops abroad into hostilities. The
War Powers Resolution (P.L. 93-148), a 1973 legislative attempt to clarify that dispute,
requires the President to consult with and report to Congress any introduction of U.S. forces
into hostilities or imminent hostilities. The War Powers Resolution also requires that troops
usually be withdrawn after 60 days if Congress does not approve a continued stay.  It does
not provide a mechanism for Congress to disapprove the initial deployment of troops.
Congress’ primary power to exercise control over peacekeeping deployments and
expenditures is the power of the purse, but many consider this insufficient.  Not all Members
wish to change this situation, preferring not to take a position on uses of force abroad.
The first session of the 104th Congress rejected attempts to repeal the War Powers Act
and substitute another mechanism.  Since then, several Congress’ have debated placing
conditions on peacekeeping deployments, although most such efforts have been defeated.
The Bush Administration is continuing the practice, adopted during the Clinton years, of
informing Congress of  ongoing and/or planned operations through monthly meetings with
staff of the armed services and foreign affairs committees.
Proposed Legislative Restrictions on U.S. Miliary Participation in
U.N. Peacekeeping Operations
The treaty creating the International Criminal Court, which has the power to prosecute
alleged war criminals, will come into force in July 2002.  This event has prompted a debate
among U.S. policymakers as to whether it is necessary to attempt to protect U.S. citizens
from protection by the court, and, if so, how.  One concern is the possible risk to U.S.
soldiers serving in international peacekeeping operations being accused of and prosecuted
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for war crimes.  Although the treaty creating the court was signed by a U.S. official on behalf
of former President Clinton, President Clinton said that he would not forward it to the Senate
for ratification, and recommended that his successor also not forward it, until specific U.S.
concerns were met.  In early May 2002, the Bush Administration renounced its support for
the court, and on May 16, 2002, the Washington Post reported that the Bush Administration
is seeking U.N. assurances that all personnel serving in the U.N.’s East Timor operation will
be protected against prosecution for war crimes by a local court or international tribunal.
Some policymakers argue that U.S. citizens can be subject to the Court’s jurisdiction
if they are operating in a country that has joined the treaty, even though the United States has
not.  Others dismiss the idea that the United States runs a serious risk that its innocent
servicemembers will be prosecuted, arguing that the Court was established to prosecute war
criminals, and not servicemembers involved in peacekeeping duties.  (For more information
on the issues involved in the establishment and operation of the ICC, see CRS Report
RL30020, The International Criminal Court Treaty: Description, Policy Issues, and
Congressional Concerns, and CRS Report RL30091, The Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court: Selected Legal and Constitutional Issues.)
Several bills have been introduced in the 106th and 107th Congresses regarding the ICC.
Language regarding the ICC is also contained in the FY2002 Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations Act (H.R. 4775), as reported by the House Appropriations Committee, and
in H.R.1646, the FY2002/FY2003 Foreign Relations Authorization Act, as passed by the
House in 2001.  The DOD FY2003 authorization bill, H.R. 4546 (H.Rept. 107-436, as passed
by the House on May 10, contains a Sense Of Congress declaration (Section 1034) stating
that none of the funds authorized by the act should be used to assist, support, or cooperate
with the ICC.
The “American Servicemembers’ Protection Act” provisions in the FY2002
supplemental appropriations bill, as yet unnumbered, as approved by the House
Appropriations Committee on May 15, 2002, were added by amendment during the
committee mark-up.  Their language is similar to that of the DeLay/Helms companion bills
(H.R. 1794/S.857) introduced in May 2001.  Among other provisions, the language in the
FY2002 emergency supplemental appropriations bill, as posted on the House Appropriations
Committee’s website, requires the President to ensure that each resolution of the Security
Council authorizing any Chapter VI or Chapter VII U.N. peace operation would permanently
exempt, “at a minimum, members of the Armed Forces of the United States participating in
such operation from criminal prosecution or other assertion of jurisdiction by the
International Criminal Court for actions undertaken by such personnel in connection with the
operation.”  Under these provisions, U.S. military forces may not participate in a U.N. peace
operation after the date that the Rome Statute enters into effect unless the President has
certified that they “are able to participate...without risk of criminal prosecution or other
assertion of jurisdiction by the International Criminal Court” because (1) the U.N. Security
Council has provided such an exemption, (2) because each country in which the operation
is conducted is not a party to the ICC and has not invoked its jurisdiction, (3) because each
country  has entered into an agreement from proceeding against members of the U.S. armed
forces, or (4) because U.S. national interests justify such participation.  The President is
granted  waiver authority for successive periods of one year if he reports to Congress that the
ICC is a party to a binding agreement not to exercise jurisdiction over covered U.S. and
allied persons, and related assurances. The language in H.R. 1646, the foreign relations
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authorization act as approved by the House, contains similar provisions to that of the FY2002
supplemental. It does not, however, contain a national interest exception (point 4, above). 
Funding Issues:  Costs and Reimbursements
Costs. Until the 1990s, DOD did not keep a central accounting of figures on
peacekeeping because these “incremental” costs  (i.e., the amount spent on peacekeeping
over that which would have been normally spent on regular salaries, and on routine training,
equipment repairs and replacements) were minimal.  But, as U.S. spending on U.S. and U.N.
peacekeeping activities soared in the early to mid-1990s, Congress became increasingly
concerned about the costs of those operations.  Because the “incremental” costs of
peacekeeping and other military contingency operations generally have been funded through
supplemental appropriations, for many years DOD had to postpone and cancel training and
maintenance and to rescind funds from weapons modernizations and other accounts.
Supplemental appropriations designated as “emergency” funding do not disrupt DOD
activities and plans, but they can be controversial as they can raise overall spending above
the budget caps set by Congress. During the second session of the 104th Congress, Members
sought to resolve the problem by budgeting funding for ongoing missions in an “Overseas
Contingency Operations Transfer Fund,” (OCOTF) in the annual DOD measures.  This
mechanism was included in legislation of the 105th and 106th Congresses, but the President
still sought supplemental funding for Bosnia, and then Kosovo, in subsequent years.  
The costs of such operation became relatively uncontroversial in the 107th Congress,
however, as the Bush Administration sought reductions in Balkans peacekeeping, and the
operations in Southwest Asia became more accepted as ongoing operations.  This led to a
change in the budgeting mechanisms for such operations, as discussed in the section on
transparency, below.  For more information on the concept of  incremental costs, and on
legislative and executive attempts to create more efficient methods of funding contingency
operations see CRS Report 98-823, Military Contingency Funding for Bosnia, Southwest
Asia, and Other Operations: Questions and Answers. At the end of this report, there is a
detailed chart of  DOD  incremental costs (actuals) of peacekeeping and related security
operations from FY1991-FY2000, and part-year FY2001 incremental costs, all in current
dollars. (DOD has not made the information necessary to update this chart available to CRS.)
Incremental costs in constant FY2002 dollars though FY2000 are available in CRS Report
RS21013, Costs of Major U.S. Wars and Recent U.S. Overseas Military Operations.  
Transparency of Budgeting for Peacekeeping and Other Contingency
Operations.  As a result of decisions by the Bush Administration and the Congress
concerning the FY2002 budget, as of that fiscal year the costs of the Balkans and Southwest
Asia contingency operations are being budgeted within the services’ accounts as ongoing
peacetime operations.   A July 2001 GAO defense budget report (GAO-01-829) warned that
such a budgeting practice could have both positive and negative effects: while this funding
method “could provide an incentive to better control costs,” it could also mean that Congress
will no longer be able to track the expenditure of those funds and know of their possible
diversion to other uses.  The GAO suggested that Congress could require (1) written
notification if funds intended for SWA were obligated for other purposes and (2) that DOD
continue to report monthly on the costs of SWA operations.  
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For FY2002, the conference version of the DOD appropriations bill, H.R. 3338, placed
only some $50 million in the OCOTF as a “central response fund from which the Secretary
of Defense can address unknown and unexpected overseas continency costs,” according to
the bill’s statement of the managers (H.Rept. 107-350).  The statement broke down the total
amount for Balkans operations – some $2.144 billion or about $650 million less than the
President’s request – among the services in the operations and maintenance, and the military
personnel accounts, but did not specify the amounts for SWA operations.  The conference
report was approved by the House and Senate on December 20, 2001, and signed into law
(P.L. 107-117) on January 10, 2002.    
Congress took steps, however, that appeared intended to keep public future amounts
requested for contingency operations.  Section 8097 of H.R. 3338/P.L. 107-117 requires the
FY2003 and all future budget requests to “include separate budget justification documents
for costs of United States Armed Forces’ participation in contingency operations for the
Military Personnel accounts, the Overseas Continency Operations Transfer Fund, the
Operation and Maintenance accounts, and the Procurement accounts.”  In keeping with the
provisions of 2001 which mandated that Balkans and SWA operations be considered
ongoing, not contingency, operations,  the FY2003 budget request and supporting budget
justification documents do not break out information on these costs.  The OCOTF request
for FY2003, which does not include these operations, is $50 million.  Another $50 million
remains in the fund from unexpended FY2002 balances.  The FY2003  DOD authorization
bills, H.R. 4546 and S. 2514, follow this protocol, funding the OCOTF at $50 million.
U.N. Reimbursements.  Some Members argue that the costs of U.S. direct or
indirect support for U.N. and U.N.-sanctioned operations, including DOD incremental costs,
should be credited towards the payment of U.S. assessments for U.N. peacekeeping
operations and other payments to the U.N.  (See CRS Issue Brief IB90103 for more on U.N.
assessments.)  (In the 104th Congress, provisions to credit such support towards U.S.
assessments for U.N. peacekeeping were included in “Contract with America” legislation –
S. 5 and H.R. 7 – but did not become law.)  Currently, the United States is reimbursed only
for the troops which it contributes to actual U.N. operations, and for assistance provided
under Letters of Assist where the U.N. specifically pledges reimbursement.  A little under
one-third of U.N. reimbursements for troop contributions is credited to DOD to cover DOD’s
incremental costs in deploying troops; the remainder is credited to the State Department.  
Policymakers who object to provisions requiring reimbursement for all costs to the
United States of supporting U.N. operations note that such assistance is voluntary and would
not be provided if it were not in the U.S. interest.  Also, many other countries provide
voluntary support that is not reimbursed or credited to their assessments by the United
Nations.  A State Department compilation of the 1995 voluntary contributions of the United
States and 13 other countries to support U.N. peacekeeping operations (excluding economic
and humanitarian aid), shows that the United States provided 57%, 11 NATO countries and
Australia some 42%, and Japan slightly under one percent.  (The contributions are
incremental costs for either FY1995 or calendar year 1995.)  Subsequently, the State
Department questioned whether these figures, because of the different methods used to
compile them,  presented  a  valid comparison, and did not update them. (An exhaustive CRS
attempt in 1999 to gather information on NATO contributions to Kosovo found no single,
definitive source of consistent data on military and non-military contributions, and at best
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could provide an approximate idea of relative costs.  See CRS Report RL30398, NATO
Burdensharing and Kosovo, A Preliminary Report.)
The FY2001 and FY2002 DOD appropriations acts do not follow DOD appropriations
acts for FY1998-FY2000 in requiring quarterly reports from the Defense Secretary on all
DOD costs to support U.N. peacekeeping and U.N. Security Council resolutions, and an
accounting of efforts to seek credit against past U.N. expenditures and U.N. compensation
for DOD costs in supporting of U.N. activities.  They do repeat provisions from those acts
requiring DOD to notify specified committees 15 days before obligating or spending funds
to transfer defense articles or services (other than intelligence) to another nation or
international organization for use in any U.N. or other international peacekeeping,
peace-enforcement or humanitarian operation.  (Section 8072 in the FY2002 version.)
Suitability and Desirability as a U.S. Military Mission
Some analysts question whether military forces in general and U.S. military forces in
particular are, by character, doctrine, and training, suited to carry out peacekeeping
operations. One reason given is that military forces cultivate the instincts and skills to be
fighters, while the skills and instincts needed for peacekeeping are those inculcated by law
enforcement training. (In some peacekeeping operations, however, the military’s training to
work in units and employ higher levels of force are seen as necessary.)  Another reason is
that peacekeeping requires a different approach than combat operations.  Many senior U.S.
military planners hold that successful military action requires “overwhelming” force.  U.S.
troops are taught to apply “decisive” force to defeat an enemy.  Most peacekeeping tasks,
however, require restraint, not an “overwhelming” or “decisive” use of force.
As the military has gained more experience with peacekeeping missions and analyzed
their requirements, and as some officers and analysts have begun to look more favorably on
peacekeeping as a mission, many assert that to be a good peacekeeper, one must first be a
good soldier.  (“Peacekeeping is not a job for soldiers, but only soldiers can do it,” states  the
Army field manual outlining doctrine on Peace Operations, FM 100-23, in a quote attributed
to former U.N. Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold.)  In part this argument is based on the
growing recognition that troops in peacekeeping operations need military and combat skills
to respond to unanticipated risks, in part it is based on the judgment that part of the task of
a peacekeeping operation is to provide a deterrent to the continued use of force and that the
most credible deterrent is a soldier well-trained for combat.  U.S. military participation in
peacekeeping has become regarded more favorably by some military officers who argue  that
although combat skills deteriorate (“degrade”) during peace operations, many other skills
necessary for military operations are enhanced.  (See section on Training Effects, below.)
Questions also arise as to whether peacekeeping is a desirable mission for U.S. forces.
On the one hand, some point out that as representatives of the sole world “superpower,”  U.S.
troops are particularly vulnerable to attempts to sabotage peacekeeping operations by those
who want to convince potential followers of their power by successfully engaging U.S.
forces.  On the other, analysts note that other countries are often reluctant to commit forces
if the United States does not, and that U.S. participation in peacekeeping is an important part
of “shaping” the world environment to decrease the possibilities of future conflict and war.
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In recent years, the military services made several changes to adjust for peacekeeping
missions.  In particular, the U.S. military has been increasing special training for
peacekeeping functions.  Most of the training is for units who are deployed, or expect to be
deployed, for peace operations: the Army norm is that units should receive four to six weeks
of special training.  The unified commands have developed exercise programs involving staff
planning, command and control, simulated deployments, and training with non-governmental
organizations and foreign militaries.  Units that are drawn upon for peacekeeping operations
have also incorporated training for peace operations in their normal training routines.
Some analysts argue that U.S. combat forces should not be used for peacekeeping.
Instead, they suggest two options: establish a separate peacekeeping force, distinct from the
current military service branches, or create special units dedicated solely to peacekeeping
within the current services.  (In PDD 25, the Administration stated that it did not support the
concept of a standing U.N. army, nor would it earmark  military units for participation in
U.N. peacekeeping operations.)  The military has resisted the concept of dedicated units.
On June 12, 2001,  DOD sponsored a briefing on an Institute of Defense Analysis
defense transformation study commissioned by the Secretary of Defense that recommended
the creation of a standing humanitarian joint task force, “with a joint command and control
capability similar to our war-fighting capability...with some immediately [sic] airlift and
security capabilities” to respond to humanitarian crises.  According to the briefing transcript
([http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2001/t06122001_t612tran.html]), the task force
would precede civilian contractors to the field as a stop-gap measure in a benign environment
and for a limited time in a more troubled environment where “the circumstances required a
military response.” These do not appear to be the type of dedicated peacekeeping units
envisioned by some, but questions might be raised as to whether they eventually engage in
humanitarian interventions that could require a longer than anticipated military presence.
The Readiness Controversy and Related Concerns
“Readiness” issues have been a driving force in congressional debate over the extent to
which the U.S. military should engage in peacekeeping. Readiness is a subjective and
ambiguous concept referring to the degree to which the armed forces are “prepared” — i.e.,
currently in training and well-equipped — to  defend the nation.  As the U.S. military has
been increasingly called upon to perform peacekeeping and other non-combat missions —
at the same time as it has downsized significantly — Members have questioned whether U.S.
military forces can perform their “core” mission, i.e., national defense where U.S. vital
interests are threatened, if they engage extensively in other activities.  Readiness, as related
to peacekeeping, depends on several factors: the size of the force, the numbers of troops
devoted to specific tasks (force structure), the size, length, and frequency of deployments
(operational tempo), and opportunities for training in combat skills during a peace operation.
There is some difference of opinion concerning the importance of the readiness issue.
Peacekeeping (and all other operations other than war) is directly related to the readiness
problem, if one is looking strictly at the results of the readiness ratings that are calculated
periodically.  That is because all the standards – all the factors and tests – that are used to
measure “readiness” only measure the military’s combat preparedness, that is, its ability to
fight and win wars.  These standards measure the availability of a unit’s personnel, the state
of a unit’s equipment, and the performance of a unit’s members on tests of their wartime
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skills.  When the military deploys large numbers of personnel to peacekeeping operations,
scores on these measures can decline, and they have declined in some cases.
This happens for several reasons.  For one, people are transferred from units that are not
deployed to peace operations to take part in peacekeeping.  Second, funds for training and
equipment have been diverted in the past to fund peacekeeping operations. Third, military
personnel cannot continue to practice all their combat skills when participating in peace
operations; and fourth, the U.S. military has been deployed for peacekeeping operations at
the same time that the size of the force, particularly the army, has been reduced substantially.
Whether a potential or actual “degradation” of readiness ratings is important depends
on one’s perspective on the utility of  readiness measures. The standard of readiness ratings
rests on the concept that the U.S. military must be prepared to fight two nearly simultaneous
major regional conflicts (MRCs). Those who believe that in holding the military to that
standard when there are many other necessary military missions see the measures as flawed.
They argue that peacekeeping is a significant mission and therefore  readiness standards
should also measure, or otherwise account for, performance of peacekeeping tasks. 
 
If one looks at the larger “readiness” problem, that is the perception that U.S. military
personnel are in general overworked and underpaid, that military equipment is in poor shape,
that there are rampant shortages of spare parts, and that the military forces cannot recruit and
retain needed personnel, the relationship of peacekeeping to readiness is less pronounced.
Peacekeeping is responsible to some extent for this larger readiness problem, but there are
many other contributing factors. The strong economy is frequently cited as impairing the
military’s ability to recruit and retain personnel.  Equipment is deteriorating and spare parts
are increasingly in demand not only because of peacekeeping deployments, but also in many
cases because the equipment was old and deteriorating.  The area in which peacekeeping
most affects readiness is the stress that frequent deployments have placed on certain troops
– the so-called increase in Operational tempo (optempo) and personnel tempo (perstempo).
Training Effects.  The effects of peace operations on a soldier’s ability to maintain
military and combat skills through training has been a source of concern; military analysts
and personnel have noticed mixed effects on soldiers’ skills, and thus on readiness.  For
some types of military activities and skills, participation in peacekeeping operations is
considered to be a good substitute for normal training activities.  This is true for many
activities short of high-intensity combat skills, e.g., support functions, such as intelligence,
medical, logistics, transportation and engineering, where units deployed in peacekeeping
perform tasks that are quite similar to their wartime tasks, and in an environment that
approaches a wartime environment.  Many military officers and analysts state that
peacekeeping operations provide far superior opportunities for small unit commanders to
develop leadership skills than do normal training exercises. Nevertheless, for combat
personnel, it is indisputable that some combat skills may deteriorate and the “warrior” spirit
may be taxed by the mundane tasks performed and the restraint required by peacekeeping.
All acknowledge that participation in peacekeeping operations significantly “degrades”
crucial combat skills such as shooting (“live firepower”) skills, coordination of the use of
weapons and equipment (combined arms skills), and large unit maneuver ability, which
cannot be practiced in a peace operation. (The longer the deployment, the greater the
deterioration of skills, according to some analysts.)  To reduce such deterioration, efforts are
made for troops to continue some level of combat training during peacekeeping deployments.
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For instance, the Army  provides opportunities for those deployed to Bosnia and Kosovo to
practice wartime skills while on duty. 
Deployment Strains.  The increased “optempo” demanded by peacekeeping takes
time from necessary maintenance, repairs, and combat training, and can shorten the useful
life of equipment.  The “perstempo” problem is regarded as particularly severe for the Army.
For several years, the Army was deploying the same units over and over to peacekeeping
operations, and the pace of deployment was viewed as too demanding, affecting morale by
keeping personnel away from families for too long, and, some argue, affecting recruitment.
In one of the first publicly-available studies of the stresses caused by peacekeeping, a March
1995 GAO report (GAO/NSIAD-95-51) found that the increasing “op tempo,” deployments
due to peacekeeping, and reduced force structure taxed certain Navy and Marine Corps units,
and “heavily” stressed certain Army support forces, such as quartermaster and transportation
units, and specialized Air Force aircraft critical to the early stages of a MRC, to an extent that
could endanger DOD’s ability to respond quickly to MRCs.  DOD disagreed at the time, but
the pace of operations subsequently became a source of concern throughout the services and
DOD, as well as in Congress. A July 2000 GAO report (GAO/NSIAD-00-164) found  several
shortages in forces needed for contingency operations, including an inadequate number of
active-duty civil affairs personnel, Navy/Marine Corps land-based EA-6B squadrons, fully
trained and available Air Force AWACs aircraft crews, and fully-trained U-2 pilots.
The Army has also taken  steps to deal with some of its problems by the realignment
and better management of its resources, as has the Air Force. In recent years, the army has
addressed perstempo strains by limiting deployments to 6 months, and including national
guard and reserve units among those on the roster to serve in Bosnia, thus attempting to
reduce the optempo of combat duty units.  The Air Force, since 1999, has established Air
Expeditionary Units that deploy under a predictable rotation system in an attempt to reduce
the stresses of deployment to enforce no-fly zones over northern and southern Iraq and to
meet other disaster and humanitarian assistance demands as they arise.  Nevertheless, in July
2000, the GAO issued a report noting that the Air Force was unable to meet the demand for
aerial surveillance with AWAC aircraft because of a shortage of AWAC crews. In some
cases, however, these solutions may generate other problems.  For instance, the Army’s
attempts to relieve the stresses of frequent deployments on its active forces by instead
deploying reservists may, some analysts worry, affect guard and reserve personnel
recruitment and retention.  Some analysts suggest, however, that continued improvements
in resource management could ease stresses.  Others prefer to change force size or structure.
Debate Over Force Size and Structure.  Many defense analysts and military
officers have questioned whether the military is appropriately sized and structured to fight
two MRCs and also take on peacekeeping and other so-called “non-combat” missions.  For
several years, many Members have expressed concern that the U.S. military is too small and
too stretched to take on peacekeeping operations.  Since the mid-1990s, several policymakers
and military experts have suggested that 540,000 would be an appropriate size for the army
to prepare for two MRCs while undertaking peacekeeping missions, i.e., considerably more
than the current 480,000 troop army end strength.  The FY2003 Defense Authorization bill
(H.R. 4546, H.Rept. 107-436), as passed by the House, would increase the end strength of
the Army by 1.1% to 484,800, and that of the active duty reserve force by 2.2%, as well as
increasing the other services end strengths.  The Senate version of the bill, as reported by the
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Senate Armed Services Committee on May 15 (S. 2514, S.Rept. 107-151), did not increase
Army end strength, but did recommend a slight increase in the active duty reserve force.
There are also proposals to restructure U.S. forces.  These include proposals to increase
the total number of personnel most heavily taxed by peacekeeping, and to establish special
dedicated units for peacekeeping.  Some military analysts suggest that the overall force might
be restructured to include more of the types of specialities needed for peacekeeping, and in
units sized appropriately for peace operations.  For instance, civil affairs, psychological
operations (PSYOPS), and military police units are specialties that are particularly needed
in peace operations, but are in short supply in the active military.  This could entail
increasing the number of such specialties in the active force and reserve, or altering the
current requirement that the military be prepared to engage in two nearly simultaneous
MRCs.  Some analysts have suggested that structuring the forces to engage in one MRC and
a few small-scale contingencies such as peace operations might be more appropriate to
current world conditions; others argue that this would leave the United States too vulnerable
to military challenges from states such as Iraq and North Korea.
Greater Use of the Reserves.  Increasing use of Army reservists and National
Guardsmen in peacekeeping operations culminated in the Texas Army National Guard’s 49th
Armored Division’s assumption of command of the U.S. Bosnia SFOR contingent on March
7, 2000.  Some 1,200 Texas guardsmen were in charge until October 2000, when they were
replaced by the active duty Third Infantry Division.  Reportedly, it was the first time since
World War II that a National Guard General had commanded active duty Army troops, of
which there were some 3,000.  For the near future, Army National Guard divisions will
alternate with active duty divisions in commanding the U.S. SFOR contingent; after October
2002, the Army plans for it to be commanded by National Guardsmen through 2005.
Two areas of concern have been the cost of their use and the effect on recruitment and
retention. The costs of increasing the use of the Reserves and Guard for peacekeeping could
vary substantially, depending on the size of the active duty force and on the “tempo” of
operations, i.e., the size, length, and frequency of deployments, according to defense experts.
While Reservists and Guardsmen are less expensive to maintain on a daily basis than active
duty soldiers, who are paid year round, once deployed they temporarily increase the number
of active duty personnel and thus the overall cost of the force.  They also add more to the
incremental cost of an operation than do active duty soldiers.  GAO/NSIAD-00-162 states
that the “integration of Guard forces in peacekeeping missions such as Bosnia significantly
increases the cost of these missions...”  Many defense experts fear that repeated call-ups for
reservists and guards are affecting their recruitment and retention, thus depleting the pool
available for such operations and for deployment to a major regional conflict.  To mitigate
that prospect, the Army announced on March 6, 2000, that future deployments of active and
reserve components for operations other than war would be limited to 179 days.  This has
displeased some reservists who desire longer tours for promotion and other career reasons.
Bosnia and Kosovo Debates
Since 1993, the Balkans debates have reflected many of the above issues.  On the issue
of presidential authority to deploy troops on a NATO peacekeeping mission to Bosnia,
Congress in effect deferred to President Clinton, leaving unchallenged his initial decision to
seek congressional support, but not authorization, for the deployment.  Despite continuing
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reservations about the Bosnia mission, Congress has continued to fund U.S. military actions
there.  Even Members who have opposed the deployment have stated that they did not wish
to deprive U.S. troops of the means to perform their mission. For information on Kosovo,
Macedonia, and Bosnia, and other provisions and legislation related to U.S. deployments
there, see products listed in the For Additional Reading section, below. 
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DOD Incremental Costs of U.S. International Peace and Security Commitments, FY1991-FY2001
(Budget authority in millions of current year dollars)







AREAS OF ONGOING OPERATIONS
Southwest Asia/Iraq
Provide Comfort/Northern Watch 325.0 101.5 116.6 91.8 138.2 88.9 93.1 136.0 156.4 143.7 11.3 1,502.5
Southern Watch/Air Expeditionary Force – – 715.9 333.0 468.4 576.3 597.3 1,497.2 954.8 755.4 673.5 6,571.8
Vigilant Warrior – -- – – 257.7 – – – – – – 257.7
Desert Strike/Intrinsic Action/Desert Spring -- -- -- -- – -- 102.7 5.6 13.8 239.8 207.2 569.1
Desert Thunder (Force Buildup, 11/98) -- -- -- -- -- -- – – 43.5 – – 43.5
Desert Fox (Air Strikes, 12/98) -- -- -- -- -- -- – – 92.9 – – 92.9
UNIKOM (UN/Iraq Observer Group) 21.5 4.9 6.0 – -- – – – – – – 32.4
   Total Southwest Asia/Iraq 346.5 106.4 838.5 424.8 864.3 665.2 793.1 1,638.8 1,261.4 1,138.9 992.0 9,069.9 1,227.3  See Notes
Former Yugoslavia (Bosnia)
IFOR/SFOR/Joint Forge – -- -- -- -- 2,231.7 2,087.5 1,792.8 1,431.2 1,381.8 919.9 9,844.9
Other Former Yugoslavia Operations* -- 5.8 138.8 292.0 347.4 288.3 195.0 169.9 155.4 101.3 61.5 1,755.4
    Total Bosnia -- 5.8 138.8 292.0 347.4 2,520.0 2,282.5 1,962.7 1,586.6 1,483.1 981.4 11,600.3 1,348.5 1,315.6
Former Yugoslavia (Kosovo)
Balkan Calm (Observer Mission, Pre-Air War) – -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 34.6 – – 34.6
Eagle Eye (Air Verification 10/98-03/99) -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 20.3 – – 20.3
Noble Anvil (Air War) -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1,891.4 – – 1,891.4
Joint Guardian (KFOR) – – – – – – – – 1,044.5 1,803.1 931.4 3,779.0
Sustain Hope (Refugee Assistance) -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 141.6 – – 141.6
     Total Kosovo – -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 3,132.4 1,803.1 931.4 5,866.9 1,743.7 1,528.6
Korea Readiness* – – – 69.7 90.9 – – – – – – 160.6 – –
COMPLETED OPERATIONS
Haiti*
Safe Harbor – 9.3 – -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 9.3
Embargo/Interdiction/Sanctions Enforcement – – 2.8 65.8 – -- -- -- -- -- -- 68.6
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Uphold Democracy -- – – 198.2 448.8 – -- -- -- -- -- 647.0
UNMIH – – – – 56.5 86.9 – -- -- -- -- 143.4
   Total Haiti -- 9.3 2.8 264.0 505.3 86.9 – -- -- -- -- 868.3
Somalia – 1.6 943.1 528.0 49.4 – -- -- -- -- -- 1,522.1
Rwanda -- 1.0 106.7 36.5 -- -- -- -- -- -- 144.2
Angola -- 0.5 0.1 2.6 – -- -- -- -- -- -- 3.2
Cambodia -- 0.5 0.5 5.0 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 6.0
Western Sahara -- 0.9 0.3 0.1 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1.3
East Timor (Operation Stabilize) -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1.5 56.8 – 58.3
TOTALS 346.5 125.0 1,925.1 1,692.9 1,893.8 3,272.1 3,075.6 3,601.5 5,981.9 4,481.8 2,904.8 29,301.1 4,319.5 2,844.2
Source:  Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller);  FY2001 figures provided August 23, 2001; no later figures have been made available.
*Notes: This chart consists of the DOD incremental costs involved in U.S. support for and participation in peacekeeping and in related humanitarian and security operations, including U.S. unilateral
operations, NATO operations, U.N. operations, and ad hoc coalition operations.  Opinion as to which of them constitute “peacekeeping” or “peace operations” differ.  U.N. reimbursements are not deducted.
Totals may not add due to rounding.  Other Former Yugoslavia operations include Able Sentry (Macedonia), Deny Flight/Decisive Edge, UNCRO (Zagreb), Sharp Guard (Adriatic), Provide Promise
(Humanitarian Assistance), Deliberate Forge.  Because Korea Readiness has long been considered an on-going peacetime function of U.S. troops, DOD only counts above-normal levels of activity as
incremental costs.  The Haiti accounts do not include the DOD processing of Haitian migrants, which totaled $108.1 million in FY1994 and $63.7 million in FY1995. As of FY2002, the Bush
Administration has determined that costs for Southwest Asia will be included in the services’ budgets, therefore only a rounded figure of $1,200.0 is available in public budget documents.
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